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I.

INTRODUCTION

To corporation s, direct foreign investment is an instrument of internation al
business integration :

it is a means for acquiring ownership and control of enter

prises in foreign countries.

Government policy towards foreign investment can,

therefore, be viewed in terms of approaches to multination al corporation s. This
paper examines the evolving practices of major Atlantic nations towards this new
form of internation al business.
Perhaps no single statement poses the problem more succinctly than that of
George Ball:
••• the structure of the multination al
corporation is a modern concept, de
signed to meet the requirement s of a
modern age; the nation state is a very
old-fashion ed idea and badly adapted to
serve the needs of our present complex
world. 1
His point is controversi al and intriguing, and provides a useful starting point
for discussion,

Communicat ions improvement s are breating down internation al

barriers and integrating different parts of the globe.

Corporation s are reacting

to the changing internation al envirorunent by becoming multination al.

Since they

are developing internation al business structures faster than governments are
evolving supra-natio nal institution s, the process is beginning to cause strain
and concern.
At the moment the internation al penetration by corporation s is not very ex
tensive and the problem is in no sense critical.

But direct foreign investment

is growing very rapidly and if it continues to ,grow at the rate of ten percent
per year, as it has in recent years, the problem could become more serious.
1George W. Ball, 11The Promise of the t1ultination
al Corporation ,°
Magazine, June 1967, p. 80.

If

Fortune

- 2 George Ball is right in saying that the nation is an old-fashion ed idea, badly
adapted to the needs of our present world, then somehow it must be replaced by
new political structures.

In particular, and most important, the United States
Herely to pose the

as a nation state must be transformed into something else.

problem c,f how this change will be brought about suggests the difficultie s and
complexitie s which lie ahead.

A.

Problems Associated with the Multination al Corporation ·
Nearly every country feels it needs the capita¾ technology, and access to

markets brought by multination al corporation s, and many countries offer a variety of incentives to attract more foreign investment.

Nonetheless , there is

also an undercurren t of concern associated with multination al corporation s,
sometimes intense, more often not.

In this essay we concentrate on these

concerns as they are emerging in reaction to ihe rapidly changing contours of
the interna_tion al economy.

There is no attempt to ask whether foreign invest

ment -is good or bad; instead we attempt to describe how certain countries
currently perceive the phenomenon of the multination al corporation ·and the
hesitant steps they are taking

in

learning to live with it.

To many countries, the multination al corporation s is something of a new
problem and there is much uncertainty about ho.-, to deal with it; general ap
prehension is found more often than articulated analysis.
appreciated ; but there is suspicion of its ne~mess.
cern is the locus of decision-ma ki~g:

Its benefits one

In essence~ the main con

countries fear that important decisions

will be made outside their country or, if made inside their country, by for. eigners.

In particular, they are afraid of losing power to the United States.

They fear that some decision '"taken in Detroitn will shut down a factory in
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their country.

It is possible to identify a number of problems which keep re

curring:
(i) ·

The multinational firm is a medium for the intrusion of the laws, politics,

foreign policy and culture of one country into another.

This relationship is

assymetr~cal for the flow tends to be from the parent country to the subsidiary
country rather than vice versa.

The issue of extra-territor iality with regard

to such things as anti-trust and trading with the enemy is one of the main

focuses of debate and concern.
(ii)

1:iultinational corporations reduce the ability of the government to control

the economy.

Multinational corporations, because of their size and interna

tional connections, have a certain flexibility for escaping regulations imposed
in one country.

The nature and effectiveness of traditional policy instru

ments - monetary policy, fiscal policy, anti-_trust, taxation - change when
important segments of the economy are foreign~owned.
(iii) The multinational corporation tends to centralize research and entre
preneurial decision-making in the home country.
taken, the ''backwashi: effects may outweigh the

Unless countermeasures are
11

spread 1; effects, and the

technology gap may be perpetuated rather than alleviated.

Over-reliance on

multinational corporations may cause the country to remain a margin rather
than become a center.
(iv)

i.1ultinational corporations often. occupy a dominant position in their

industry.

Countries are concerned that they will not get a fair share of

production and exports.

Decisions depend on the horizons and outlook of the

head office management,. which can be limited and biased.

Each country is

aware that other countries, includins the United States, put pressures on the
multinational corporation to produce, export, import or invest in a particular
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1.

THE .MULTINATIONAL. CORPORATION IS A _LINK BETWEEN NATIONS
.AND A VIADUCT FOR TRANSHITTING PI',ESSUPJ~S FR.OH mm COUNTRY TO ANOTHER.

2.

THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION OPERATES IN A DECISION
HIERARCHY v!ITH SEVERAL PEAKS.

3. .

THE GOVERNHENT OF THE PAREN'r: CORPORATIOl{ WILL NORHALLY
HOLD IT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTION OF ITS SUBSIDIARY;
BUT TUE GOVERNHENT 1:-l THE RECEIVIli!G COUXTRY WILL NOT
NORMALLY DECLARE JURISDICTION OVER ACTIVITIES OF THE
PAPJ~NT.

[

U.S. Govt.

J

Foreign Gov't.

il
Subsidiary

--

Foreign
SubsidiaFy

· ..

.,....:......,, ...
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way.

A countr y withou t the abilit y to make its presen ce effect
ive in the

decisi on-ma king proces s may end up with a smalle r share than
otherw ise.
(v)

Natur al resour ces indus tries are someti mes highly oligo polist
ic, and

have only a relati vely small number of finns.

The price a countr y obtain s

for its raw mater ials is not set object ively in a free marke
t, but is deter
mined by bargai ning and negot iation with the domina nt corpo ration
s. Unless
a countr y

has the requis ite knowle dge and effect ivene ss, it may get a srnaU.
er

than possib le share of the benef its.
B.

Mains prings of Policy
The polici es of govern ments toward s direct invest ments are varied
:

they

are gener ally suspic ious but lack articu lation ; they are not
system atic but
ambiv alent and changi ng; and they stem from many source s.
There are purely prote ctioni st aspect s.

Govern ments foster their own

nation al busine ss by discri minat ing agains t foreig ners at home
and subsid izing
their own indust ry abroad .

The United States , for examp le, facili tates

direct foreig n invest ment by its corpo ration s becaus e of an assume
d identi ty
of intel'e stbetw een nation al welfa re and the goals of its busine
ss firms. Other
count ries restri ct Americ an invest ment on the same ground s~
The tariff used to be the chief instru ment for protec ting nation
al busi- ·
· ness from foreig ners (altho ugh in some cases, notabl y Canad
a, the tariff at
tracte d foreig n owner ship while protec ting nation al indus try).

At presen t,

many goven unents are surren dering this instru ment as
part of t·he trend t'oward's

tradE? libera lizati on but they have not compl etely· lost their
concer n for
p'tcin'ofatng their nation al busin ess.

Other measu res are used instea d.

Para

doxic ally, in many cases, libera lizati on of inflow s of capita
l is thoug ht·of
as a means to streng then nation al busine ss.

Count ries hope that the entry of

\.

- 6 -

foreign investment will increase the efficiency and strength of their_own
Thus, at the same time as they allow a certain amount of foreign

business.

investment, they take steps to make sure that it does not attain a dominant
position.

The Japanese Report Concerning the Liberalization of Inward In

vestments

py the Foreign Investment Council~ for example 1 stresses the need

during the process of liberalization for

11

counter-measure s 11 to strengthen

the capacity of Japanese enterprises and to insure that they will be able
to compete against foreign rivals on an equal footing.

Similar policies and at

titudes are found in France and even in England.
Protection of the nation state is also a motive for controlling foreign
investment.

Too open an economy is seen as a threat to national existence.

By closing it somewhat, the government seeks to preserve cultural and communal
unity aI!.d to strengthen its control over the economy.

Equally important is

policy directed towards increasing the rate of technological change and the
level of capital fonnation in the country.

Are multinational corporations the

best way to gain access to foreign markets and needed raw material?

Does a

country need its own national or multinational enterprise to achieve its econ
omic ends or can it rely on foreign corporations?

These questions are raised

with increasing frequency.
At the deepest level itis impossible to separate economic and political
goals.

The corporation and the commuJ:1ity, as represented by the nation state,

operate on different planes of ra,tionality.

Sometimes the corporate plane,

ass,ociated with the measuring rod of money is referred to as "economic" while
the nation state's goals are labeled

"politicalH.

It is possible to make

this separation only when problems are vietv-ed in the small.

At the glo'bal

··- 7 -

.level, the major concern is the well-b eing of the popula tion and, in this
plane,
econom ic and politic al aspects merge •
. As a concre te exampl e of this we might note that the attitud e of govern

ments towards foreign investm ent is freque ntly correla ted with.t heir attitud
e
towards the proper balance between the private sector and the public sector.
Those coun,tr ies in which there is a heavy relianc e on private initiat ive
genera lly adopt libera l attitud es towards interna tional capita l movements.

In

those countr ies where the governm ent plays a more active role in the econom
y,
policy towards foreign investm ent tends to be more restric tive and stringe
nt.
Both types of governm ents defend their politic al economy on ground s of
both
politic s and econom ics.
Finally , we might note that policie s are often taken on an,ad ~ ' case
by case basis; or, as the French say, one procE:eds "coup

a

coup".

This is a

reflect ion of uncert ainty about the problem of foreign investm ent and the
lack of clear-c ut simple solutio ns.
new problem .

For many countr ies, this is a relativ ely

The feeling runs deep that close attenti on ought to be paid to

multin ational corpor ations in order to preserv e nation al indepen dence and
to
insure continu ed eocnom ic prospe rity, but there are no clear ideas as to
what
must be done and which instrum ents should be used.

The United States seems

to prefer to see· the problem handled by interna Uonal anti-tr ust - an extensi
on
abroad of its domest ic solutio n.

Other countr ies tend to stress admini strativ e

contro l, but withou t a clear idea of what-sh ould be done and how.

Japan is

perhap s the except ion in having a long""-stariding, clear, and well articul
ated
policy. towards foreign investm ent.
At presen t most governm ents are not facing up to the problem and tend
to ignore the true nature of the multin ational corpor ation.

They do'not see
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it as a powerful force revolutionizing the economic and political structure,
and inexorably reducing the autonomy of all nations.

They regard it as merely

an extension of nationalism and not as a supra-national phenomenon.

They

are, as George Ball puts it, out of phase with the dynamics of international
business.
The United States often thinks of foreign subsidiaries as, simply, Amer
ican firms operating abroad, and tries to project its national power th~ough
its foreign investment.
and economic power.

It uses foreign investment to expand its political

It often seems to be unaware that the feedback created

by the multinational corporation will limit its power as a sovereign state.

Host governments often act as if they were dealing with a domestic enter
prise under their own laws, and behave as if the fore-ign ownership were in
cidental.

They try to make foreign subsidiaries conform to national practice;

they do not always succeed, pricesly because the multinational corporation

is a different being.

Few· countries have evolved anything resembling a coherent policy state-ment' instead policy is marked by sporadic emotional outbreaks and ~d hoc at
tempts to resist the intrusion of the multinational corporation into national
life.

Specific incidents from time to time, light up the issue:

.Ford's

purchase of out-standing shares in a subsidiary in England which it had con
trolled for many years; Chrysler's increase in its ownership of Simca in
France; the Mercantile case in Canada; the rllmor of J! tak~over of a l~;:ge·
Belgian oil company by an American firm; .the refusal of an American subsid
iary to fill an export order from Cuba. - · These spe.-cific cas-es a:rg typ:±c!ally
exaggerated out-of proportion.to their direct significance, as aggrieved
competitors, radical trade unions, civil service frustrations and anti-Ameri~
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canism arise simultaneously.

The debate polarizes and the rhetoric becomes

extravagai.,t.
How are we to interpret these periodic flare-ups of concern we see in
every country?

The investigations of the incidents usually tone things

down, .and many view the problem as a wholly irrational matter.

Through time

a sanguine attitude is restored as the complexities and diffuseness of the

discussion wearies the listener and massages him back to repose.
More likely the crises reveal some very basic aspects about the econ
omic environment.of our society; about the ways important decisions are
made by private and public institutions, and the problems and possibilities
created for nation states by the multinationalization of business.

To label

_-these crises irrational, irrelevant, or unimportant may be to deny ourselves
significant insights about the world in which we live.
C. .

_ Machinery

An examination of the·machinery used to control foreign investment indi

cates a number of shortcomings in horizons .and perspectuves on the part o~
. __governments.

The decision on policy towards foreign investment is often closely

·associated with balance of payments considerations.

Traditionally,. the

Treasury, Ministry of Finance, or Central Bank were the government agencies
·.. mos.t con-cerned with foreign capital and they viewed the problem largely from
its foreign exchange aspects.

This led them to take too short-run a view,

· ·en:cot'.rragfug -or di~couraging foreign inves trnent according to the s·tate ,of
the balance of payments in any particular years, without sufficient regard
to.the _long-term effects on industrial organization.
The contrast between corporations and governments on this point is
st_riking and ironic.

The :corporations tYI>ically have long-term horizons; they

.

- 10 -

do not invest for short-term profits, but in order to establish a basis for
future growth.

They deeply resent having to curtail investment at a parti

cular point because of a balance of payments crisis.

Governments, on the

other hand, have often made decisions on foreign investment largely in tenns
of balance of payments, paying little attention if any, to effects on the

structure of industry and the performance of the economy.
This is changing, however.

The issues of industrial organization are

coming more and more to the forefront and the machinery for dealing with for
eign investment has been adjusting accordingly.

In England and France, for

example, it is now the practice for the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance,
respectively, to consult with various other parts of the government, both for
mally and informally to ensure that the technological and structural impli
cations of foreign investment are properly considered before a decision is
reached.
Another problem is that Governments have tended to take too narrow a
view.

They have tried, for example, to control the foreign-owned firm with

in their country with little regard to·what was happening elsewhere or to the
policies followed by other countries.

They concentrate on.the activities of

foreign enterprises within their border and do not pay sufficient attention
- to the world-wide context of the multinational corporation.

In short, they

have not fully come to grips with the fact that a subsidiary operating in
their country is not an independent entity, but part of a world-wide corpora-
tion- and that its activities are integrated, coordinated, and harmonized
with t:h~ i:tctivi:ties of its siste:rs and parent.

Again, the horizon of governments contrasts unfavourably with the hori.
zon of the multinational corporations.

The corporations are usually highly

·-
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sensi tive to the multi natio nal chara cteris tics of their
opera tions .

Gover n

ments , howev er, have seldom come to grips with the funda
menta l proble m of
inter natio nal affili ation s.

In dealin g with foreig n inves tment , they place

the accen t on the fact that a company is foreig n-own ed
rathe r than on the
fact that it has foreig n affili ation s.

They ask, for examp le, that the

foreig n firm behav e like a dome stic finn thoug h this radic
ally contr adict s
the natur e of a subsi diary .

The subsi diary is part of a multi natio nal cor

porat e group and its action s must be coord inated with
those of its siste r
and paren t compo nents.
Anoth er limit ation of much of the e:x:isc ing machi nery
for dealin g with
foreig n inves tment is that i t focus es on new inves tment
s, negle cting estab 
lishe d enter prise s.

The foreig n finn is scrut inize d and evalu ated much

more close ly at the time of entry than after it has been
estab lishe d.

Once

a foreig n firm enter s a count ry, it is subje ct to much
.less exam inatio n than
it receiv ed on its initi al appli catio n.

This is in part due to the fact

that in some count ries foreig n inves tment is a recen t
proble m and the
initi al conce rn has focus ed on the Upsur ge of new inves
tment s.

This is per

haps- satisf actor y so long as the foreig n firm does not
occup y a domin ant
posit ion.

Where it is very impo rtant in a se~to r, its behav ior on
resea rch,

expor ts and finan ce and its relati onsh ip with its affil
iates become matte rs
of .conti nuing conce rn to the count ry in quest ion.
It is quite clear that in many• insta nces, the only way
to deal with
multi natio nal corpo ration s is throu gh inter natio nal coope
ration .

To date,

howev er, such coope ration has been most embry onic in
form.
(i)

It has not been possi ble~ for exa:rifple, to get a satisf
actor y resol ution

of the proble ms of defin ing the limit s of a coun try's
contr ol over foreig n

- 12 business within its borders.

Foreign business often receives better treatment

than national business because it can call upon the home country for support.

This is an especiaiiy important problem

for underdeveloped countries.

Har

monization is difficult because of the Hide divergencies in the rules govern. ing th~ rights of private property in the West from the attitudes in many
underdeveloped countries.

Even between developed countries, there is often

no common view on what is meant by

11

retroactive1:, :;discrdminator,y 11 o~ lldue

process".
(ii)

On taxation problems:. there is cooperation to avoid double, taxation,

but this is only a beginning.

Some very real and important conflicts about

. dividing up the taxes paid by multinational corporations are beginning to
appear and i-Jill increase as the multinational corporation grows in importance.
(iii)

In anti-trust, the OECD is attempting to slowly build up bilateral

and multilateral agreement on procedures for notification and· consul·tation.
There is hardly any attempt in sig~t on the question.of harmonization.
(iv)

The EEC provides an interesting ·example of the weakness of i'nterna--

tional cooperation.

The Common Market countries have been unable to achieve

anything approaching a common policy on foreign investment.

The commission

.in l}russels has not even been able to obtain. authorization for a study on the
extent of foreign investment because of widely diverging attitudes on the
problem.

··.,·•··--i--r,.½·~
··-·· ..-.
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Ii.

THE UNITED KINGDOH

Althoug h the United Kingdom has more inward direct investm ent, both ab
solute ly and propor tionate ly, than do the contin ental countr ies, she
has, in
the past, been less concern ed with the difficu lties, and more impres sed
by the
advanta ges of foreign capita l.

Becaus e of her

11

laissez -faire 11 traditi ons and

her role as a major export er of capita l and a major financ ial center ,
the
Country has, for the most part, been commit ted to free interna tional
capita l
movem ents, except for regula tions concern ed Hith foreign exchang e contro
l.
To Britain , the danger s of foreign investm ent have been a distin ctly
second ary issue.

The overal l level of American investm ent in England is still

not very high, and the United Kingdo m's ties uith the United States make
her fear Americ an "imper ialism" less than the French .

The countr y's chronic

balance of paymen ts problem has made her solicit ous of foreign capita
l.
eign

For.;;.

investm ent is, therefo re, welcomed for the capita l, foreign exchan ge,

techno logy, and compet ition it brings .
Howeve r, English attitud es are changin g somewh at.

The econom ic diffi

culties of the last twenty years, and the changin g world.e nvironm ent have
led
to a re-exam ination of traditi onal attitud es towards the economy, the
United

·states , and Europe .
eign investm ent.

This changin g focus has import ant implic ations for for

It would be misl!;!a ding to exagge rate these changes at this.

. t;Ufte; ,µµt_it is import ant to take into accoun t a certain increas
e in con:ce:rn

and a certain empha.s is on regula tion that was former ly absent .
t~ht'

The new hesi

step·s are worth analyzi ng for the qualita tive indica tions that they

give of the problem s the English perceiv e and the directi on their policy
may
take if trends, regarde d as undesi rable, continu e.
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The British government's economic policy in the past has centered
mainly on fiscal and monetary policy.

Although this approach helped to

achieve full employment, it did not provide sufficient growth or competi
tive strength.

The new strategy involves more direct government inter

vention arid planning to stimulate productivity and growth.

New government

institutions have been created and old ones strengthened to plan, to con
trol wages and prices, to rationalize the industrial structure, to develop
policies on restrictive practices and monopoly, to achieve regional balance,
and to narrow the ' 1 technological gap".

A natural concommitant of the ex,

panded government role has been a greater degree of surveillance, super
vision, and regulation of foreign investment.
The machinery for dealing with foreign investment can be briefly des
cribed as follm-1s:

all inward and outward movements of foreign investment

require approval under the foreign exchange laws; any firm wishing to in
vest in England must file an application with the Bank of England, which
acts as agency for the Treasury in this matter.

The treasury's main concern

traditionally has been to ensure that a sufficient portion: of the total
investment is financed from external sources, and that local borrowing
associated with foreign direct investment is kent within reasonable proper-

tions.

A rule of thumb (modified when an investment is beneficial) is

that 100 percent of the fixed assets must be financed from abroad •
. Applications for foreign investment are no longer considered solely
in terms of exchan3e control; the Treasury now consults other ministri:es
which examine the applications from the point of view of their particular
responsibilities.

Each application also· receives scrutiny from the sponsor-
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ing department of the particular industry involved in order to evaluate the
possible impact of the foreign investment on the economy's structure and per
formance.
Although many factors are now considered when a position is taken on in
ward and outward flows of capital, there are few firmly articulated ideas of
what the proper policy should be.

There are intermittent public debates on

the subject, as well as continuous discussion by officic1,ls~ •a11c:l• ~,'·QQJ;"t,a,in
0

amount of research on the impact of foreign investment.

Cases are considered

on their merit, and the principles behind the new policy, if that term can be
used to describe the slowly evolving practices,. are not publicly declared';
it would be unwarranted to try to fit them into a rigid frameuork.
From time to time, in a number of very important cases, the government
has required certain ,:assurances 11 before it would pennit an extension of
direct investment.

An examination of these cases and the assurances that

were required are useful to the understanding of some of the fears and appre
hensions in the presence of the multinational corporations in Erigland, as well
as the ambivalent nature of the government's pdlicies •.
Two of the more important cases are the Ford Case and the Rootes~Chrysler
C.ase.

These cases received great public attention because of the strategic

position of the automobile industry, its long tradition of labor difficulties
and its importance in exports.

In the fonner case, Ford was allowed to move

from majority control to complete control only after it gave assu;ra:nces ort
certain aspects of its performance:

namely, that it would continue its major

expansion program, continue to plough back ai high pli'oportion of the profi'ts,
maintain continuity in management policies, · continue to obtain a high proportion of its components in.the United Kingdom, and keep its exports high.

In

- 16 the Rootes Case, Chrysler was allowed to purchase 30 percent of the equity
on the condition that it would not attempt to acquire a majority holding
without permission.

A number of other cases (Trinidad Oil 1956, Phillips

Pye 1967) could also be mentioned, and there may be more which did not
reach the public eye.
On a qualitative basis, these assurances reflect the fear that Britain

will be harmed by a shift i!1 the locus of control.

Ford justified the

extension of its control on the grounds it would permit rationalization and
integration of activity on a world-wide basis.
national corporations are supposed to do.

This is precisely what multi

The British ,:assurances: 1 represent

an opposition to the basic principles of the corporation insofar as these
assurances try to stop Ford from investing, sourcing, and managing in the way
it feels most profitable.
The Rootes case illustrates the ambivalent nature of policies.
investment was needed and feared.

Foreign

Rootes was in serious difficulty and in

danger of bankruptcy and needed the strong backing that Chrysler could pro

vide in capital and technology.

No British source was available:

the

survival of Rootes would increase competition; and the industry already had
major foreign investments.

The deal was therefore allowed to go through but

not before it was.. modified· in a general and make--shift way.
The British on the whole acc'ept the need for multinational corporations
and take for .granted the advantages of large s_ize; they support mergei:: artd

growth of United Kingdom-firms and hope to develop their own multinational
corporations.

Like other countries, they do not seem to be fully aware of

the implications for government policy uhen important sectors of the world
economy come to be dominated by a few multinational giants, who can move

- 17 quickly across national borders.

Should such a situation arise 1 it would

mark an end to national seclusion, and would drastically change the rela
tionship between business and the state.

The British response to this

changing international economic environment is, in 8enerali,.ad hoc and
pragmatic.

The measures taken are hesitant steps in a confusing situation.

"

In this respect, their policies lag behind the multinational corporations
who are whorking on global strategies for dealing with the technological
changes that are re-shaping international linkagE!s •

•
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III.

THE UNITED STATES.

The attitude of the United States toward foreign investment is influenced
by practical and ideological considerati ons.

The United States, along with

other English-spe aking countries, has traditional ly been committed to the

concept of free enterprise, which implies the freedom of each individual to
use his economic assets as he prefers.

This implies free capital movements

on the internation al plane, and United States policy has been to encourage
the removal of restriction s on foreign investment and to press for free and
equal treatment of capital from whatever source on a non-discrim inatory basis.
·0n the practical side, there is little conflict between this approach

and whatever protection ist inclination s
may have.

the government of the United States

The volume of inward direct foreign investment is small and for

eign companies do not occupy a dominant or "threatenin g" position in impor

tant sectors of the economy.

Host multination al corporation s are American

in origin, a:nd policies to promote internation al capital movements are
consistent with general policies to promote American national business.
Foreign investment is also seen as consistent with the goals of economic

"'

growth and developmen t.

The government assmnes that, for example, direct

investment in raw .materials is needed in order to insure adequate supply, to
avoid becoming P.rey to foreign monopolists , to guard against price fluctua

tions, and to overcome the di.fficultie s caused by shortages. of capital
abroad, and risk aversion by foreign countaries.

To the extent that foreign

direct investment achieves these goals, it promotes the health of the United
States economy. ·Similarly, direct investment in manufacturi ng, which maximizes
the quasi-rent for the parent company on technologic al and other advantages
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and protects it from foreign competition, can also be seen as being in harmony
with the general economic interesL. Most important, direct investment, be
cause it leads American corporations to establish connections in foreign coun""'
tries and to obtain a direct linkage to developments abroad, encourages a cos
mopolitan outlook and increases the availability to U.S. corporations of
technological and other developments in foreign countries.

This helps to guard

the country against the dangers of isole.tion.
The encouragement to foreign investment by the United States is not un
limited, nor is the freedom granted,

to private economic interests unconditional.

The government has placed restrictions on foreign investment abraod for balance
of payments reasons and as part of anti-trust policy.

There has always been

·in the United States a fear of large concentrations of capital and a suspicion
of big corporations.

The anti-trust laHs are the most highly developed defense

Jn the United States against uncontrolled economic power, and in a sense they
define the American approach to multinational corporations.

Ir.. several in

stances, the government has influel:!ced and interfered with business decisions
on foreign investment when it was feared that they would reduce competition

in the industry and react badly ori the American economy.

The general American

approach on the national and international plane is to keep direct government
regulation and plannine to a minimu111, and to create an industrial structure
1

conducive to desirable econordc p erforma.nce.

Except for certain acts prohibited

as .illegal under the anti~trust lai-,s, firms are allowed wide scope in their
decision-making r:,hile government focuses on establishing
a framework to en,.
courage competitioP.; (though this policy does not preclude high concentration.)

- 20 -

The United States, 2t present, is by far the oost econow.ically advanced
country, as well as the leadin8 political force in the world. This has impor
tant.implications for its attitude towards the multinational corporatior, be-
cause it creates the need to help less c1.dvanced countries, and to establish
an environment which preserves the economic political, and social features
The motives for American involve

that the United S~ates regards as desirable.

ment in other developed countries, and especially in underdeveloped countries
stems from its humanitarian desire to help in a situation of inequality, its
recognition of·the dangers created by er.vy of its aGvanced position, and a
dynamism inherent in A-:,erican life uhich regards the lack of world economic
integration as a challenge, and the unfinished business of helping the rest
of the world master its material environment as a new frontier.

The United

States has developed a large and efficient mechanism for producing economic
growth; it is a repository of kr..m-rledee and it has highly developed manage
It is natural

ment techniques, advanced technology, and abundant capital.
to expect that these resources could and should be used in

than the continental United States.

a wider sphere

The question for American policy is to

decide on the appropriate form.
In this context, the multinational corporation is seen as having a
vital role in t~ansferring .American technology and capital abroad, and in
acting as a catalyst to stimulate foreign enterprises and to
demonstrate new methods.
.

.

The strongest advocates

.

'of the creative role of the .American business abroad are the businessmen
themselves; but in the last analysis; it is agreed by most-officials that
..

since the United States placed heavy emphasis on private initiative and de~
cision-making at home it will also place primary reliance on foreign in..:..

.,
- 21 vestme nt as the vehicl e for p-:-omo ting econo~ nic develo pment
and bringi ng about
social and politi cal ch~nc2 s £brood .
J. Anthon y Paunch presen ts the pi:o:Jle m this way:

The blunt fa.ct - like it or not - is that
the Unii:ed States m.s.na gerial capita lism is the
one democ rc2tic fc-:-ce in being the one that can
take the measu re of Sino-S oviet capita lism in
the drive for i,1tern a~ion: :il c2pita l forma tion. 1
This is no iC:le boast.

L:.n.::o]_n Gcrdor r poj_nts to the re.asor is w.l)y neithe r

trade nor ai_d is .: suffici e:-1.t instru:. 11e~t for fore:f.g n develo
pment .
No longer <lo w2 hold to the mecha nistic
analy1 :icul fr&..7le-i;.;c,:rk of cla3si cal econom ics
with its image cf <1towic lc:rtd, labor, and cap
ital p?.rtic Je.s h'.3ld to3ethe -.:- by the m2gne tic
forc~s of pure eco1wr .lic ration ality. in its
pl-9.CP. tod.2.y we to.l:c>. 2. El'.'.>~Q re::il::. .stic view
whkh givr:!s a centrn l place to leade: rship by
entrcp1 ·e;2e1.1 rs in findin g new ways to combin e
the factor G of produ ction for greate r outpu t. 2

'l'his belief in the V<:lua ble, if not:: ii.1.dis pensab {e, role .of
privat e
bus:.Lnes•s has an ic!eolo cir.al ccu:nt erpart .

It argt1~s th".<{t if o1:1ier coUnf ties

are to catch up to the United States they must emula te the
basic featur es

of the Americ an econom ic ut:.:-uc ture:
attitu de to privat e invest ment.

this neans they must adopt a simila r

Natur ally,·

::..t

is realiz· ed that the system

must be adapte d to local circu~ stance s abroad , but it is
felt by many, that
the fundam entals cf free enterp rise must be observ ed.

Richar d Robins on,

an astute observ er of intern ationa l busine ss notes that:

1J'.. -An·thorty Paunch , ,;A Bucin2 ssma:1 rs Philos ophy .for Foreig n Aff_ai rs,"
Har,va~d Busdne s s R-~'vj ~w.
2 Ltnco ln Gordon
,

11

Pr:i.va te Enterp rise and Econom ic Develo pment ," Harva rd

)}~~~,J 3.l!l;/;i. 1;;,(v, July-A ugust 1960.

It would seem that there is a horrible
urgency in making Western economic concepts
internationally viable if man's dignity is
to be preserved - c:nd incj_deni:ally a profit
able private business. 1
A national system is a mosaic containing legal, economic, cultural,
social, and political asp=cts.

A policy to encourage American investment

implies, to some extent, a policy to export other elements as well.
The foreign penetration of f.Jllerican business has important political
consequences for the United States.

The multinational corporation weaves

a tangled web which often involves the United States government more than
the government intends.

For one thing, the go-,,ermnent is obliged to protect

its business corporations, and cannot afford to be indifferent to its respon
sibility towa-;:-ds foreign investment.

Moreover, there is a legal necessity

t.o treat foreign investment as an extension of the American economy, and to
In American

subject it to the same rules and regulations as domestic assets.
eyes, this extension·is viewed as being natural and reasonable.

The govern

ment cannot renounce control over its ci tize:.1.s and especially cannot pe:.7Ili t
them to evade Ame=ican law and policy through fore:]_gn investment.

In pro

tecting foreign investment, the government has not attempted to set up colonial
systems like the one that characterized Eur.ope, but it is satisfied if there
is law and order and equal treatment for American business.
The problem is often viewed indifferent tenna abroad, partly because
of·emotioµal factors, and partly because there is no ·agreement on how,to
define basic terms ; · e.g. , non-discrimination or non-!'e troactivi ty.

This

conflict e5f views and interests lends to political repercussion, a:nd hence
to political problems.

For~ign investment abroad creates fears and resent

ment wlt!ich reverberate on fm1erican foreign policy.

Even if the United States

1 Richard Rcbinson, International Busir.o2ss Po)..icy (New York: Holt, Rine-

hart, and W1:_nston, Inc., 1964), p. "220.

·
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regards it as an economic phenomenon, it is viewed abroad as a political
phenomenon.

The greater the contribution of investment, and the greater

its·impact, the more it becomes the focus of attention and a nproblem".
Leo rfodel, in Foreign Affairs, describes the essential dynamics of
the poli_tics of private foreigr. investment.

He explores the question of

how the intrusion of American businessmen into a foreign country can bring
about a nationalistic reaction which forces changes in American policy.
No country wants to see its basic in
dustries controlled by foreigners - even
by efficient and friendly foreieners. The
social and political ramifications of for
eign cc;ntrol over large segments of the
economy affect investors, businessmen and
technicians, competing firms, the banking
and financial markets, and even the foreign
. policy of a country ••• The very fact that
U.S. enterprises abroad are so large and
so successful has generated a.resurgence of
economic nationalism - a mixture of mercan
tile protectionism with political overtones .
••• The greater the extent to which U.S. com
panies dominate the economy of foreign coun
tries, the greater will be the fear and re
sentment to which they give rise. If for
eign governments believe that the operations
of U.S. enterprise place pressure on their
· economy and foreign policies, they will in
evitably decide to exert counter-pressure to
neutralize the dominance of American firms.
Such a game of pressure and counter-pressure
cannot be in the long-run interest of either
country.

If the United States adopts policies de
signed to permit private companies to assume
and retain a dominant role in the economies·
of unwilling hos ts, it ~,till encounter resis
tance that will inevitably spread from the
'edonomic to the &tplotnat1'c spheres. 1
1 Leo

Model, "The Politics of Private Foreign Investment, ' 1 Foreign
Affairs, June 1967, p. 648.

_ - 24 -

To counter this, Hodel advocates a change in American policy which, at
present, almost automatically supports the foreign expansion of United_States
business.

He advocates a policy of restraint to stem the tide of the multi:

national corporation and to mitigate some of the irritating features of its
impact by eroding its dynamic integrating character.
Such a policy on direct investment
requires great foresight and restraint by
U.S. companies. In the long run, it is the
only tenable policy because it is in accord
with the economic interest of business a:nd
the national interest of both the United
States and foreign countries. The overwhelming economic power of the United State·s is
shown by the fact that some of our giant com
panies are larger than the entireeconomi esof
small but highly industrialized countries like
Belgimn and the Netherlands; they are incom
parably larger than the entire economies of
nearly all of the less devel,oped countries.
Economic power of this magnitude carries with
it equivalent responsibility . If our companies
use their power with consideration for the 't-iell~
being of other countries, as ~,Efll a·s· fdr o't1r' otm.,
they can be of tretnendous" help in-creating a pros
perous world economy employing modern methods of
production. Otherwise their economic powt;:;1: will
be a constant irritant in-our diplomatic relations
with the rest of the world and will ultimately de
feat their own interests. 1
The problem in underdeveloped countries is, if anything, more severe.
Leland Johnson points out that
••• despite its economic contributions, U.S. pri
vate capital is a source of :rese:ntrq~I).t, conflict,
and distrust in many areas of Latin America, and
this situation is bein~ exploited.by extreme left-.
wing political groups.
1ied Model, op. cit., p. 648.

2telaild Johnson, "U.S. Business Interests in Cuba and the Rise of Castro,a.
World Politics~ Vol. 17 (April 1965), pp. 410-59~
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-

writing from a point of view sympathetic to business, concludes that
••• the presence and character of U.S. investment in Cuba did play a role in Castro's ability
to maintain a measure of popular support while
simultaneou sly waging his propaganda campaign
against the United States and moving toward the
Soviet Union. I
He notes that American foreign policy was seen to be motivated by the desire
to protect governmen~ investment.

Quite apart fro.n the question as to whether this
explanation was actually the basis for U.S. gov
ern.~ent policy at the time, the critical point
to remembe~ is that the objective nature of rela
tions between the United States and Cuba made it
easier for Castro's followers, at his prodding,
to believe that the @otivation of the United States
ste:umed from a desire to protect its economic
interests. 2

The very presence of American business abroad is, thus, an important
complicatin g factor in American foreign policy and by no means a necessarily
positive one even from the P-nerican point of view.

1t.eland Johnson, op. cit.
2 lbid., p. 455.
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THE COMHON i''!APJIBT

. The probleill of American corporations in Europe is a subject of passion
ate controversy.

Politics are mixed with economics and there has been no

success in adopting a common attitude.

Countries have different interests

and different vieupoints not easily reconciled.

Even if governments were to

behave rationally, it would be difficult to come to agreement on the exact
nature of the problem and the appropriate solution.

In fact, the natural

disagreements are intensified, because governments are myopic, and think in
terms of short time spans and narrow geographic barriers.
The formation of the European Common Market reflects the realization.
that economic forces have outgro,m the nation state; and the removal of
trade barriers is already beginning to revolutionize the structure and loca
tion of production.

Many believe that the full potentials of th-e change

in economic structure made possible by the Common Uarket cannot be realized
.without a change in business organization.

Just as the integration ()_f the ..

United States economy required the creation of national firms, it is argued
that the integration of Europe will require, at the very least,· the creation of European firms whose operations are not confined to one country, but ~pan
the continent.

C. P. Kindleberger puts the problem forcefully and succinctly.
Economic integration probably necessitates the de
velopment of.corporations that are ·equally at home
in the various political entities party to the in- .
tegration attc:mpt ••• If the Common liarket repulses
the P..merican giant corporations, and fails to estab
lish European incorporation, the Europeanmovement ·
may fall short of real intE!gt'ation. 1

1c. P. Kindleberger, i;European Integr2tion and the International Corpora
tion," Columbia Journal of Business, Winter 1966.

- 27 The creation of European firms has, however, turned out to be a
and painful process for the fragmented European industry.

slow

The business

enterprises of Europe are only slowly adapting to the new opportunities and
.are encountering numerous obstacles in their attempts to enlarge and expand
to continental or global proportions. 1

Many firms are finding it particularly

difficult to merge with firms from other countries and to consolidate opera
tions across national frontiers.

The European fitrtis are, to some extent;

caught off-balance by the rapid pace of_technologic al change and many economic
institutions are conservative and unadapted to the scope and scale of modern
technology.

In many cases American firms are finding it easier to become "European",
in the sense of integrating operations on a Common Harket basis, than the
European firms themselves.

As strangers, they are less caught up in past
They have sreatermaneuv erability and

antagonisms and are far more mobile.

flexibility,

and in addition, possess superior technological and marketing

experience in the modern: and rapidly growing sectors.
Another important advantage of American firms is-their highly developed
structure of business organization~ 2

-

.hnerican firms went through a process

of consolidation and amalgamation at the end of the 19th century in response
to the.railroad and the creation of the national-econom y.

The creation of

business units, straddling various regions of the country and various indus
tries, led to the evolution of a highly developed corporate structure with a
1The Connnon Harket COilllllissicin for example, notes that at pre.sent there
is no European corporate form and that the':'exfs'.t'E!fice of ''si:k di'.f'f.\'ef~rtt>nattl::onal
systems of corporate law provides a barrier to iriternational_ businessirttegr a
tion. It recommends that the siie conclude a_convention which will provide for
the establishment of ncommunity--law Companies" able to operate freely and uni
formly throughout the member_ countries •.
·--·
. 2 The evolution of the American :Business corporation as presented here, .is
deac:ribed in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. 1 StraJ:E!gy .?-nd S tructm:::e (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966).
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on and contro l
specia lized head office conce ntratin g on b~sine ss admin istrati
ling the widesp read empire .

A furthe r evolu tion occurr ed in the 1920's with

flexib le and
the creati on of the multi divisi onal corpo ration , a partic ularly
~ynam ic form of busine ss organ izatio n.

This form penni ts the additi on of

specia lized
new divisi ons and has in the gener al office "a large brain" whose
develo pment .
functi on is to conce ntrate on strate gic aspec ts of growth and
of planni ng over
The Americ an firm is thus prepar ed to cope with the proble ms
are stlll at·. ·the
a wide field in .a way that many Europe an fil:JllS, some of ~,hich
factor y stage of organ izatio n, are not.

In additi on the fact that many

provid ed them
.American firms have a long histor y of foreig n invest ment has
count ries - an
with much experi ence in the proble ms of operat ing i1_1 severa l
essen tial ingred ient that many Europe an firms lack.
Harke t
The emerg-ence of Americ an firms within the walls of the Common
a threat to
having the advan tages of size, struct ure,- and experi ence, poses

Europe an busine ss intere sts.

The.A merica n firms, on the one hand, bring
.

.

..

Europe an
modern method s to Europe and, by intens ifying compe tition, force
firms to moder nize as well.

On the other hand,- the streng th of the Americ an

danger that
firm often result s in the defea t of the Europe an finns, ·and the
the foreig ners will come to domin ate impor tant segme nts

of

the economy. The

ans do not want
compe titive push toward s effici ency is much needed , but Europe
to see their own £inns destro yed in the proce ss,

The proble m in Europe is how to keep things under contro l.

In many

of the.Am ex:i
quarte rs it is felt that the only way of meetin g-the challe nge
can corpo ration is to imitat e it.

There is, theref ore, a great deal of

encour aging
empha sis on buildi ng Europe an firms to match the Ameri can, by

-- 29 mergers in some cases, and by improving European access to capital and tech
nology in others.

Houever, the creation of European multination al companies

of giant size will be a slow process at best and it will take years for the
Europeans to develop countervail ing power of the magnitude required.

The

problem is thus one of finding a path of a long-run target keeping in mind
the benefits of American competition but also the long-run implication that
once a firm is established , it is difficult to dislodge.
In some cases, negative measures are used to restrict the expansion of
American corporation s, but this is fraught with difficultie s.
it requires a common approach.

For one thing,

France, for example, tried in some instances

to restrict American penetration only to find that the American firm estab

lished itself in Belgitnn from which it could have perfect access to the
French market.

In renouncing tariffs, the government finds it has surrendered

considerabl e power to protect its industry.

Another factor is that, in

many cases, the American firms are so strong in terms of finance and efficiency

that they can only be resisted at great cost.

In the Hachine Bull Case, for

example, the attempt to provide a aEuropean solution" for the computer
industry failed, and for the first round at least, the French government had
-to accept an American solution.

The new approaches replace negative measures with positive measur.es;
i._e., the go,verni'nent attempts to st:irou.lat:e na,tianal industry through various
devices rather than restrict for.eign corporation s.

The hope is that these

p.ositive steps will foster Eur_opean industry fast enough, to prevent too great
·,an Americaniz ation of European industry.

Since restriction s on American

investment taken by the· United·· St-at€!&' g-crvernmertt· for balance of paymertts
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reasons, also act to slow down American penetration, it is felt that this
approach has a good chance to succeed in keeping American investment t-iithin
reasonable proportions.

The American investment in Europe is still rela

tively small, less than 5% of the total, and there is considerable lee\-ray
for finding solutions.

Should these measures not work, there is a good chance the governments
will resort to negative measures.
tion of what might happen.

Belgium provides an ir.t-e_resting indica--

As a small country, Belgium has traditionally

been outward looking in trade and investment.

Several of its

corporations are multinational and have world-wide investment.

6i-m

leading

Belgium has

in.recent years welcomed American investment as an aid in modernizing and
reconstructing Belgrium's industry, and has felt that the American presence
provides a counter-weight to the tendency of the large countries to dominate
the Common Uarket.

Along ·with Holland, which is similarly situated, Eelgium

has been in opposition to French attempts to formulate a restrictive policy.
The liberal attitude of Belgium to foreign investment has proved, in a
sense, to be skin deep.

In response to rumours of an American takeover of

one of its large corporations, the Belgian cabinet reacted with a law which
makes it necessary to receive government approval of major investments in
Belgium corporations.

The i,1elcome of foreign investors turned out to be mo:re

a matter of pragmatism than principle, and was in this instance dropped when
a vital Belgian sector was threatened .
. Several other incidents have also given sorae second thoughts to liberal
European views.

The turning tofrard's' Eurclptfan capital markets by American

multinational corporations to finance their subsidiaries in recent years;
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has competed capital away from European firms and caused resentment.

The

fact that American companies sometimes close dm-:rn plants as well as open
them, has also led to second thoughts, as have incidents of American extra
territoriality occurring for example, when subsidiaries are legally unable
to fill orders for Cuba.
The European situation should be viewed as delicately balanced. The
protectionist instincts in each country for its own bu.sin~ss rel'.11i;),,=¼Il _EJtt:ong •.
The Common Harket itself places strains on the government as national firms
are exposed to outside competition and the pm1ers of the nation state are
eroded•.

The entry of American firms and, more generally, the problems of

reconciling Europe with its external environment and the world economy
complicates the problem further.

As long as things.proceed smoothly, in a

';balanced" fashion no problem arises; but when things move cut of line~
fear and suspicion are engendered.

Finally, there is another problem, not much talked about, but still pre
sent ben~ath the surface in all European considerations.

Though Europeans

refe.r to American investment when they discuss foreign investment, each
"

country is also concerned to some extent about investment from other coun~
tries within the Common Market.

No country wishes to have its national

business destroyed; each wants to assure for itself a fair share of European
business.
The implications of free capital movements within Europe have not been
fully thought out.

"European:: multinational corporations, no less than

Mre·ri,can multinational corporations,

intertere wi:th the· auton:omy of rtaffi.onal

governments in matters of economic and political policy am:! reduce national

- 33 truth may occur, and in a brief crisis a decision will have to be made:

whether to retreat to nationalism or to move towards supranationalism.
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sovereignty.

This should, of course, not matter in the spirit of European

economic cooperation; but in fact the spirit of nationalism has not been
completely destroyed in Europe and some European countries may resist the
supra-nationali sm implied by the modern corporation.

Economic integration

requires ·a change in both the form of business and the form of government.
The more extensive is business integration, the greater is the need to trans
fer certain powers from the national governments to supra-national powers.
Insofar as the state helps and regulates business, its scope must parallel
that of the business sector.

At a fundamental level national planning by

states and international planning by corporations are incompatable.

Similarly

other institutions such as trade unions and political parties must be inter
nationalized to cope with the wider field of operations of firms.

Economic

growth involves not just expansion but transfonnation.
Supra-nationali sm is not an easy thing to achieve.

The coagulation

of economic and political forces does not take place in a vacuµm, but is

constrained by historical, political, social and economic links.

It there

fore tends to grow around existing centers and to result in uneven develop
ment.

Although some countries gain, others lose, and nationalistic antagonism

may be intensified in the proces~.
Business integration in Europe is just beginn:J,ng and its effects have
so. far been marginal.

It .has thus been ..possible tq ,:i.g;nore them up till

ri..ot-1

and this may be a strong conditioning factor favourable to further develop
ment.

If business -moves very fast, the main thrust of amalgamation may be

over before the effects on sovereignty and independence become visible.
flourishing environment also f acili tl,rtes the pttYtess of development since

all regions share in the expansion.

Should growth slow down, a moment of

A
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CANADA

Canada is the country with the most experience of American direct invest
ment and the .American multinational corporation.

The Canadian government 1 s

national policy was unique in many·respects for a developed country, since
it used the tariff to protect Canadian industry, and not Canadian business
men.

In most countries, protection of economic nationalism meant, by and

large~ the development of an indigenous business sector in manufacturing;
in Canada the tariff stimulated industry but much of its growth·was under
the aegis of foreign corporations.
This was, in large part» out of necessity.

Canada is closely linked

to the United States and could not fail to become involved in the process

of business merger and consolidation in the United States that led to the
for,mation of the American national corporation.

Just as regional units in

the United States became integrated in the new corporations formed at the
end of the 19th century, Canadian firms also found it advantageous to merge
or be bought out by the American corporation.

The tariff perhaps obtained

for Canada a higher she.re of manufacturine than it might have obtained if
there had been a customs union with the United States, but no important
steps were taken to interfere with·capital movements and prevent business
integration.
The effects of this policy are difficult· to determine.

Canada has a

high standard of living and, over 'the long run, has grown at about the .scPJe ·
rate as the United s·tates, remaining consistently at a per capita level about
one-third les•s than that of the United States.
to that of the United States;

The economy is closely related

market structure replicates the American

structure and there is a large volume of United States-Canadian trade between
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subsid iaries and paren ts.

As far as one knows, the Americ an subsid iaries

operat e at the same level of profic iency as Canad ian firms, ·no
worse and no
better ; they seem to have adapte d, perhap s too well, to the
Canad ian en
vironm ent and ·exhib it the same genera l produ ctivity differ ential
relati ve
to the United States as do other portio ns of the Canad ian
economy.

The

major differ ence betwee n Americ an subsid iaries and Canad ian
firms is that
the boards of direct ors and execu tives in the. fonrier are .made
up of .Ameri
cans to a far greate r extent than those of the latter .

To what extent do

the simil aritie s and close linkag es betHee n Canada and the United
States
derive from their simila r situat ions, and to what exten t does
it result from
the nation al policy on tariff s and invest ment?

This is a subjec t which has

often occupi ed the minds of Canad ians but has not been adequ
ately resolv ed.
Simila rly, there is no consen sus on the, degree to'.wh ich parall
elism s in
social , politi cal and cultur al behav iour are due to policy or
enviro nmen.t .
It would be inaccu rate to say Canada is regret ting its earlie
r decisi on;
but it is fair to say that it is rethin kin8 some of its aspec
ts.
These questi ons have recent ly receiv ed close exami nation in
the report
of a govern ment task force, Foreig n Owner ship and the Struct ure
of Canad ian
Indus try, 1 (known as the Watkin s Report ) which examin ed in consid
erable de
tail the politi cal and econom ic implic ations of foreig n invest
ment in

Canada and recommended major policy change s.

The report is a probe rather

than a conclu sion, and does not repres ent Canad ian policy , which
is still
undef ined.· It is a basis for discus sion and should be interp
reted not as
what Canada is doing, but what some Canad ians are ,thirlk fog about
for;eign:
invest ment.
111 Foreig n

Owner ship and the Struct ure of Canad ian Indust ry,:: Repox:t.,.of
the Task Force on the Struct ure of Canad ian Indust ry (Ottaw a:
Queen 's Printe r
and Contr oller of Statio nary, 1968), Janua. ry 1968.

- 36 A brief examination of the main conclusions and recommendations of the
Watkins report provides a conclusion to this essay.

The report takes the

position that it would be useful to reduce the share of foreign companies
in the Canadian economy, but does not foresee a quick reversal of the present
position, and even for the long run, it accepts as the norm a much higher
involvement in multinational corporations by Canada than exists elsewhere.
It also accepts international interdependence as a fact of the world, anq
although it is nationalistic in the sense that its main concern is with the
Canadian nation, it is internationalistic in perspective and outlook.
The report argues that international solutions would in many cases be
better than national solutions to these problems, but foresees that the
political environment of the immediate future will leave international co
operation at a rudimentary

level.

Each country must therefore fortify

its own hands with additional cards by creating national instruments of
regulation, supervision. and control.
The report focuses on the fact that foreign investment is primarily
a question of large corporations and their role in the modern life.

problems arise in this context.

Two

First~ the multinational_ corporation links

separate national states and is a viaduct for transmitting pressure from
one country to another.

Since every nation has certain general interests

to protect from other nations, the government·must take steps to block

the intrusion from abroad of policies it £:eels undesirable, keeping :J,n mind

the severe limits on sovereignty and independence in the modern world.

Second, on the economic plane, the arena of large corporations is
6ligop~listic in character and not competitive.

The government cannot

rely on natural market forces to dis1:ipline private business into behaving ·

- 37 -

in a social ly desira ble manne r.

It must instea d, at the very least, plan

alongs ide the manage ment of the corpo ration to add the genera
l intere st to
the privat e intere st in decisi on-ma king.
The report argues for greate r Canad ian partic ipatio n by the
privat e
sector and the govern ment, in order to conve rt the subsid iaries
into multi
nation al ·firms rather than simply .American or Britis h firms.

To this end

it recommends that subsid iaries sell shares in Canada to allow
a greate r
Canad ian presen ce in the decisi on-ma king proces s.

It also recomm ents

the creati on of a specia l govern i,ient agency under a cabine t
minis ter to
survey , and where necess ary regula te, the behav iour of foreig
n corpo ration s
to ensure their harmon y with Canad ian econom ic and politi cal
goals.
The functi ons of this agency are:

to counte ract the pressu res exerte d

by other govern ments on the multin ationa l corpo ration s; to regula
te and
scruti nize the perfor mance of large corpo ration s in domin ant
positi ons in
order to make up for the absenc e of compe tition; to improv e
the terms on
which capita l and techno logy are induct ed from abroad and to
increa se their
benef its to the econom y; to improv e the access to foreig n marke
ts of Canad ian
produ ction and to increa se the return s to the countr y from its
-natur al re
source s; and, to coope rate with other agenc ies and to take.i
nitiat ives in
devisi ng multin ationa l-gove rnmen tal coope ration to cope with
multin ationa l
corpo ration s.

In additi on, the report recommends certai n gener al measu res

to increa se the effici ency of the Canad ian economy throug
h bette r enforc e

ment of antitr ust laws, better tariff polici es, and throug h
govern ment
help to ration alize, conso lidate , and fh1.arice Cahadi 'an '.indus
tries.
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In conclusion, Canada, relative to other Atlantic countries, is perhaps
more aware of the possibilities and problems of multinational business.

If

trends in foreign investment continue, other countries are likely to be
confronted with the same types of problems as Canada, and may have to consider
measures like those proposed by the task force.

-- 39 VI.

EPILOGUE: JAPAfl

Japan provides an epilogue to this survey of Atlantic polici~s towards
foreign investmen t and multinati onal corporati ons.

Japan is fas.t becoming

an important factor in European and American economics and business, and
her strategy towards foreign investmen t offers an instructi ve contrast to
the experienc e of countries discussed in this paper.

Japan has had very

strict control on foreign investmen t in the past but is now in the p~ocess

of changing policy to meet new challenge s.
The Japanese program for screening foreign investmen t is similar in a
formal way to that of England and France.

A special agency, the Foreign

Investmen t Council makes the final decision on whether an inward flow of
investmen t or technolog y should be allowed, based on the recommen dations

of a sub-comm ittee on which various ministrie s. are represent ed.

The greater

part of the work of examining and deciding upon applicatio ns ·is conducted

by the responsib le ministry, which_ is nearly always the lfinistry of Interna
tional Trade and Industry (HITI}.
Japan's uniquenes s lies in the fact that its policies on foreign in
vestment and the import of foreign technolog y have been so very strict. In .
. effect, it has almost completel y excluded foreign capital, and it has often
restricte d inward flows of technolog y .

The governmen t has exercised strong

pressure to encourage lic~nsing rather than direct investmen t and, when it
allows foreigner s to participa te in equity, it seldom permits a majority
interest, and even then takes additiona l steps to as.su.re that the Japanese
partner has control.
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In each case, the foreigner must bargain first uith a ;'Japanese private .
company" and then with the government, which intervenes to make sure the
agreement does not lead to Japanese dependence, upset the •:balance'' of the
particular industry, cost too much, cause the Japanese firm to lose control,
have .limitations on export rights, etc.

An exception is found in a certain number of wholly owned subsidiaries,
the so-called '•yen based 11 cor.1panies.

In theory, these are Japanese firms

and should be completely free to expand as they wish.
not always be the case.

In factj this need

For example, I.B.I1. had restrictions placed on its

share of the market to ensure that Japanese business was not s.tifled in the
computer industry.

These restrictions are informal and backed up by the

government's bargaining power through its control of taxation, etc.
Policy is now changing as reflected in the new liberalization program.

So far, liberalization has proceeded onl)' very slowly.- Its pace is de
signed to ensure that there are no foreign take-overs of important economic
sectors.

Liberalization applies only to new investment and is pennitted

only in industries where Japanese firms.2re·stron3 enough to compete effect
ively.

The aim is to open up the economy-to the extent.that foreign competi

tion strengthens, not destroys, Japanese industry.

These protectionist policies and attitudes found in Japan are of very
long standing.

Since Co~ander Perry, Japan has realized the need to import

and assimilate foreign technology, and at.the same time, the dangers offoreien
investment.

to_ Japan

The examples of other countries in Southeast Asia demon-stra.ted

hmv foreien investment would lead to a loss of -.independence and caused

.it to takesteps to protect itself from this problem.

At first, the £G>vernment

J
i

,-. '
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would not borrow abroad at all; lai:er a controlled program of foreign borrow
ing was initiated, but under strict central government supervision to ensure
that the country did not become over-indebted through unrestricted borrowing
on the part of local agencies.
Over~ll, Japanese policy has been extremely successful.

It has been

able without direct foreien investment, to absorb technology from abroad
rapidly, and to develop it on its ovm.

In many cases, the Japanese were able

to buy technology through licensing agreements at reasonable prices without
surrendering control.

In many ways, Japan is a special case which cannot be

copies, but it clearly illustrates that it is possible to bargain for the
terms on which technology is obtained abroad, and that it is possible to
s.eparate technology from control.
Perhaps the best way of understanding the Japanese case is to examine
some of the elements which gave strength to its bargaining position and how
these have been changing in recent years.
Japan's strong position on foreign capital is closely associated with
its independent foreign policy.

Now that Japan is seeking greater inter

dependence with other countries, especially OECD countries, there is pres
sure to open up its economy to foreign capital.

OECD pressure (more

specifically U.S.A. pressure) is one of the major forces behind the Japanese
liberalization program.

At the same time, the foreign policy imperative is

also>a reason for the slmmess T;!ith which liberalization is proceeding.

The

problem of renegotiating its mutual security pact with the United States and·
the speci'alproblem s of Vietnam, and I-:ainland China place Japan in a delicate
position with regard to foreign policy in the near future.

There is a feeling

that it will be easier to handle these problems without the complications of
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multinational corporations.
A major factor in Japanese bargaining p.ower is Japan's cohesiveness
and national unity.

Because of this it would be difficult, if not impossible

for a foreign firm to operate in Japan except in close cooperation with
Japanese business.

Similarly, in_ joint ventures this helps the Japanese

partner retain the upper hand.

Because of a strong sense of national identity,

Japanese businessmen could be relied on to P,rotect Japanese economic. interests.
To some extent this is now changing, as Japan becomes more internationally
minded at home and better known abroad.

The natural cultural safe-guards are

becoming less strong than they used to be.
Another factor in Japan's negotiating Pfsition is the strong government
control over the economy.

The Japanese government has traditionally exerctsed

very close supervision over Japanese business and, indeed, was directly
responsible for fostering much of its growth.

The govermnent i_s both well

informed and has themeans of enforcing its will; therefore, it is in a
strong position when dealing wit:h foreigners.

It can prevent Japanese finns

from competing among themselves'in'barga1rtt.ng and thereby weakening their
position.

It has the information to make sensible decisions on which

_ technology is needed, what it is worth, ·and what :;counter measures 1 ' liave to
be taken in order to ensure that Japanese research does not suffer as a
result of the importation.

The current policy of liberalization is weakening

the government's bargaining power tci some extent.

It is subjected to great

pressure to loosen its hold on the economy, and the anticipation of future
liberalizationenco1.1rages foreign firins to hold out for better terms.
Japan's large market is another bargaining point.
large for self-sufficiency

It is sufficiently

in most sectors,and, therefore, is not dependent
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on trade other than raw mater ials.

Through· tariff s, the govern ment can close

the Japan ese marke ts to foreig n firms unwill ing to make conce
ssions .

Llke

everyt hing else, this cuts both ways: _their large and rapidl
y growin g mar
ket is a power ful attrac tion to multin ationa l firms which are
no longer con
tent with royalt y payme nts and a licens e but want a "fair" share.

Japan is

too bit, they feel, to be left exclus ively to the Japane se.
Japan ·also derive s streng th from the fact that it is a natura
l expor t
base for South east Asia.

As a leader in this area, it is an attrac tive

partne r for Europe an firms.

It was, and often is, to the advant age of the

multin ationa l firm to give Japan jurisd iction for this area
of the world.
But as other count ries in South east Asia develo p certai n indus
tries of their
ovm, the Japane se monopoly will come under challe nge and the
multin ationa l
corpo ration will gain flexib ility.

Moreo ver, Japan is now trying more and

more to enter sophi sticat ed marke ts in indus trial count ries.

In this case?

it will have to bargai n with the Europe an and Ameri can firms
on a very dif
ferent basis than when dealin g with South east Asia alone.
In the past, one of the reason s that Japan was able to drive
so hard a
bargai n was that, in some ca~es, it was gettin g second -hand
techno logy. This
· was its advan tage as a late-c omer to the indus trial revolu tion.

Now, as many

sector s of its indust ry are pushin g at the techno logica l frontie
t:'s 1 · it may
-·

find it more diffic ult to obtain advanc ed knowle dge.
in·som e cases, but it should not be exagg erated .

This is certai nly tr.ue

Japan tradit ionall y viewed

a weak barga ining positi on as a signa l to try harde r and not
as a reason to
tlfake concie ssio:ns .

Japane se strate gy is to conce ntrate . on develo ping their.

own techno logy which they can trade for advanc ed resear ch from
other countries.

When necess ary, Japan has been i;.iillin g to wait a numbe r.of years
and.
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Lastly , much of Japan 's bargai ning streng th stems from the fact
that it
had large firms of its own.

Large conglo morate busine ss groups have played

an impor tant role in Japan 's develo pment strage gy and have made
it possib le,

in some cases, to bargai n effect ively with multin ationa l corpo
ration s. In
the future , howev er, Japane se firms, if they are going to compe
te effect ive

ly, may have to change .

Perhap s they will need to become multin ationa l cor_._

porati ons themse lves if they are to match streng th with large
Weste rn corpo ra
tions.

This will raise a number of issues .

Japan will have to accept multi- ·

nation al corpo ration s at home and coope rate in their contro l
and regula tion.
A totall y indepe ndent policy will no longer be feasib le.

Japan will then no

doubt be one of the more impor tant factor s in shapin g intern
ationa l attitu des
and machi nery for multin ationa l corpo ration s.

